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On February 3, 1875, during debates on the Civil Rights Act of that year, Representative
Niblack of Indiana1 posed this question to Representative Ben Butler of Massachusetts, sponsor
of the bill:2
“If the State courts will not guarantee the rights of the citizens of the United States,
ought we not in some way to take away from the States the right of self-government and
say that self-government is a failure?”
To Butler‟s reply that he wanted to use federal law to restrain the bad men so that the good
men might have self-government, Niblack then responded: “But if the bad men are in the
majority?”
He then followed up: “If bad men are so dominant over the good men that we
cannot have self-government, then we ought to declare that self-government is a failure.”
Having gathered his wits by this point Butler responded to Niblack, “I say that there is not
self-government there; that there is an attempt on the part of the minority to govern [a minority
whom Butler had just characterized as “murderers, lawless men, banditti… men who ride at
night in uniform and murder Negroes”]. In order to prevent that, we desire this and kindred
measures….”
This essay notes (I believe non-controversially) that the unifying impetus behind the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, was the Lockean liberal ideology set forth in
the Declaration of Independence. It then goes on to argue that this very ideology, carried within
it the seeds of destruction of Reconstruction. By Lockean liberalism I mean not only the belief
that all humans are equally entitled to the natural rights of life and liberty, including the freedom
to acquire property by labor and by contract, but also the beliefs that society should be structured
so as to allow individuals of ability and industrious character (in Locke‟s words, “the industrious
and rational”) to acquire property and attain respectability and influence, and that society as a
whole will benefit thereby. For the Americans who wrote and signed the Declaration, their
version of Lockean liberalism also included the view that representative democracy was the form
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of government that best implemented these principles. There was to be no privileged class--“no
titles of nobility”—and also no class stunted by birth under the taint of “bills of attainder.”3
The insight that in a representative democracy the majority could be tyrannical dawned
on the American framers, and they attempted to cope with it in a variety of ways not addressed
or even available in Locke‟s own theory (which offers only the power of the majority‟s will to
revolt as the check on tyranny by government).4 Still, nigh everyone knew that chattel slavery
violated natural rights, and the country muddled along with it until the Civil War.5 After the
Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery while the Fourteenth created the tools
by which the slave through his own efforts would be freed to rise in society. He would be placed
under the equal protection of laws, entitled to due process in the courts, and would be protected
against state laws abridging his rights as a free person. The Fifteenth Amendment would let him
use his own vote to secure these equal rights. The thinking was that these amendments would be
used BY the former slave; so long as laws and government enforcement of laws did not
discriminate by race, self-help was going to be his salvation. For instance, Horace Greeley wrote
in 1866, “Enfranchise the blacks, and further rebellions at the South are impossible…”6
On April 9, 1865, Robert E. Lee surrendered on behalf of the Confederacy; on April 14
President Lincoln was assassinated. In this same month, Frederick Douglass delivered a speech
to the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society wherein he posed and answered the question, “What
shall we do with the Negro?” He replied as follows:
“Do nothing with us…. [I]f the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall….
All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! If you see him
on his way to school, let him alone….If you see him going to the dinner-table at a hotel,
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Locke‟s 2d Treatise (cite passages showing no protection for the oppressed when the majority
itself does not feel threatened). James Madison emphasized having a large and diversified
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let him go! If you see him going to the ballot-box, let him alone….If you see him going
to a work-shop, just let him alone…. Let him fall if he cannot stand alone.”7
In an address to the same organization the following month, Douglass elaborated his
doctrine of self-help as including the necessary tools of a mandate of equality before the laws,
the right to testify in court, right of assembly, the right to bear arms, and the right to vote. These,
he argued were needed for the black man to secure his liberty, and without these the promise of
freedom in the Thirteenth Amendment would amount to a “a delusion, a mockery” (P.Foner, ed.
IV, 166-169).8
Seven months later, on December 18, Thaddeus Stevens addressed Congress on the need
for a Joint Committee on Reconstruction. He urged that the conquered states need a time of
federal supervision during which the former rebels can, while mingling with those persons to
whom Congress grants suffrage, “accustom themselves to make and obey equal laws.”9 He
openly stated a legislative goal of arranging representation to adjust for the end of the 3/5 clause
in such a way as (via a combination of voting freedmen and Southern loyal Unionists) to impose
and perpetuate “the Republican ascendancy” throughout the South.10 He also insisted on the need
for “protective laws” to mitigate the likelihood of the former slaves‟ being rendered victims by
their resentful former masters.11 He lamented that the commonly heard assertion, “This is a white
man‟s government,” belied the great principles of the Declaration of Independence: “Our fathers
repudiated the whole doctrine of the legal superiority of families or races, and proclaimed the
7
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Of course, once it became apparent in ensuing years that the Southern will to violence
necessitated the assistance of the strong arm of the federal government to assure that blacks
WOULD be let alone, Douglass then appealed for this assistance. P.Foner, ed., IV, 360-361;
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Ibid.; see Section 2 of 14th Amd. As it turned out, Congressional disfranchisement of the
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equality of men before the law.”12 These principles were the foundation, he maintained, and
while the desire for union with slave states had created a need to postpone the perfection of the
project, its grounding was built into the system and could now be actualized.13
Stevens continued as follows:
“This is not a „white man‟s government‟…. It is man‟s government; … not that
all men will have equal power and sway within it. Accidental circumstances, natural
and acquired endowment and ability, will vary their fortunes. But equal rights to all the
privileges of the government is [sic] innate in every [human being]….
“If equal privileges were granted to all, I should not expect any but white men to
be elected to office for long ages to come. The prejudice engendered by slavery would
not soon permit merit to be preferred to color. But it would still be beneficial to the
weaker races. In a country where political divisions will always exist, their power,
joined with just white men, would greatly modify, if it did not entirely prevent, the
injustice of majorities. Without the right of suffrage in the late slave states, (I do not
speak of the free states.) I believe the slaves had better been left in bondage.”14
These two statements capture the unity of purpose that was understood to link the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Many members of Congress understood
with Frederick Douglass that the former slaves of the South would need new tools to defend
themselves against the foreseeable hostility of former rebels amongst whom they lived, who had
risked life and limb and lost many loved ones in an effort to keep blacks enslaved. While
Congress took longer to assent to Douglass‟s [and Charles Sumner‟s] view that equal access to
vehicles of public transport and to public, albeit privately owned, inns should be secured as
properly the common law rights of all free, well-behaved persons,15 the majority of them did see,
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Such access was written into the 1875 Civil Rights Act. [give cit.] Even in the Supreme Court
decision striking down that law, The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), this common law
right receives acknowledgment in both the majority opinion by Justice Bradley (at 24-25:
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by the time the Thirteenth Amendment became law, that federal legislation was needed to assure
that the basic rights of free persons would be secured to the former slaves.
Congress secured what it saw as the basic rights of free persons via the 1866 Civil Rights
Law. Then, confronting one presidential veto after another, Congress was moved to entrench
these basic rights against potential shifts of legislative sentiment, by placing them in the
Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment.16 While the Fourteenth Amendment pended
ratification, Congress in March 1867 gave suffrage to freedmen in the ten unrestored
Confederate states (where 80% of black American adult males resided),17 in part to be used as a
tool for their self-defense, as Rep. Stevens had advised.18 This First Reconstruction Act
established manhood suffrage, minus participants in the rebellion, for elections of participants in
state constitutional conventions. These conventions were to produce constitutions that
themselves contained the same manhood suffrage, and that would be valid if approved by a
majority of registered voters.19 In this way the freedman received the tool seen as most needed
for them to defend their own freedom, the ballot. It was plain by 1867, that blacks needed not
only the ballot-box but also the cartridge-box, for their own self-defense; Republicans in
Congress believed they had provided this access in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) decision would move that protection
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Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.3189-3190 (Sen.Lyman Trumbull); Cong.Record, 43rd
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against laws depriving blacks of guns from the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Equal
Protection Clause.20
The Democrats, however, did well in northern state elections in 1867; President Johnson
by late 1868 pardoned virtually every member of the Confederacy (undoing their
disfranchisement);21 and the elected legislature in the restored state of Georgia on September 3,
1868 expelled all of its black legislators and declared blacks ineligible to serve in the legislature
(Franklin, 130-131, 222). These events, along with the prospect of protecting black voting rights
in the border states where Reconstruction could not reach, prompted the Republicans in Congress
to entrench black voting rights on a permanent basis via the Fifteenth Amendment, which the
two houses endorsed, respectively, in January and February of 1869.22 (Georgia, along with
Virginia and Mississippi, was forced to ratify the Fifteenth as a condition of readmission to the
Union. Although several northern states (with very tiny black populations) had defeated black
suffrage in recent years in state referenda, the Amendment attained ratification in less than a
year, by February 3, 1870.23
At this point the liberal beliefs in self-help, hard-work-meritocracy, and representative
democracy that had fueled the abolitionist movement bit back, motivating voters in the North to
turn their backs on Reconstruction in the belief that they had done enough and that now it was
time (a) for the former slaves to take care of themselves and (b) for the South to be allowed to
return to representative democracy rather than be ruled by an army from the outside paid for by
federal tax dollars.
To be sure, this “bite” from liberalism would not have been so devastating against
Reconstruction were it not for two accompanying elements: First, the violently vicious race
hatred that permeated much of the white South (including border states) and the more mild
racism of the North and the Southern “better” classes that fueled a neglect that was anything but
benign.24 Second, a will to duplicity and a willingness to be duped (what William Weicek more
20
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And in the even in the North it was not all that mild: many states banned (on paper at least)
black in-migration, prohibited black jury service, prohibited blacks from testifying against
whites, and had segregated schooling. Moreover, C. Vann Woodward documents numerous
instances up through the early 1860s of Republican leaders such as William Seward, Henry
Wilson, Lyman Trumbull proclaiming theirs the “white man‟s party,” or the U.S. a “white man‟s
country.” In the House of Representatives in 1866, George W. Julian announced while deploring
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politely calls “subterfuge”) which was akin in its degree of preposterousness to the lie told to
himself and others by the wife-beater who claims that his wife started the fight by “pushing [his]
buttons.”25
Still, the point here is that the liberalism that undergirded the Thirteenth Amendment
itself played a role in undoing its success. This liberalism caused the North to keep expecting the
former slave to fend for himself and to “cease being the special favorite of the laws.”26
Liberalism also caused the North to tire of paying for military rule in the South (which it had
never adequately funded in the first place), giving it up far too soon in the more or less blind
hope that representative government could succeed in the South: For the United States to
continue indefinitely as a society in which one half ruled over the other by military force would
be intolerable.
It is true that the Supreme Court played a role in diminishing the force of Reconstruction,
but in this role the Court in fact worked as the ally of majoritarian democracy.27 the four decades
following 1865 comprised a period in which the U.S. Supreme Court was particularly conscious
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of avoiding running too far afoul of the Congressional or popular will.28 It was, at base, the
American people who turned their back on Reconstruction, and they did so in significant part out
of a belief in self-government. In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court, in this period while not,
as to African-Americans at least, the heroic savior of “the rights of the individual and the minor
party” envisioned by Hamilton in Federalist #78, it was also not a demon who blocked a
democratic will to maintain Reconstruction.29 In fact, the Court in these decades functioned all
too closely as a handmaiden of democracy.
I. Rhetoric of Liberalism Deployed Against Reconstruction
As early as 1870, with the Fifteenth Amendment in place, as stalwart a Republican as
Thomas Wentworth Higginson, who had assisted John Brown and had led black troops during
the war, warned that freedmen “should not continue to be kept wards of the nation.”
Congressmember James A. Garfield (future Republican President) wrote in private letters the
same year that the African race had now received “the care of its own destiny” and that
freedmen‟s “fortunes [were now] in their own hands.” Now that the black could vote, wrote an
Illinois newspaper in support of the Fifteenth Amendment, “Let him hereafter take his chances in
the battle of life.”30 Such talk was temporarily suspended when the ensuing too-prominent-tooignore Klan reign of terror quickly convinced most (though not all) Republicans of the need for
an increased federal military and judicial enforcement presence in the South for the next few
years.31
The Enforcement Act of 1870 and the KKK Act of 1871 split the Congressional
Republicans, several (though not most) of them now siding with the Congressional Democrats‟
claim that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to restrain state action, not
28
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private crimes, and that it was up to the individual Southern states to deal with such crimes.32
The enforcement bureaucracy for these acts, like the federal army in the postbellum South, was
understaffed and underfunded as long as the acts endured, which was until the Democratic
resurgence in Congress in 1893 led to the legislative undoing of almost all of these provisions.33
In the KKK violent rampages of the early 1870s, many thousands participated, a couple thousand
were indicted, and then of the few hundred convicted only a tiny number served any time in
prison; most received suspended sentences with warnings.34
According to Eric Foner, relying on William Gillette, Robert Kaczorowski, James
W.Garner, and Allen Trelease, these federal enforcement efforts by 1872 “had broken the Klan‟s
back and produced a dramatic decline in violence throughout the South.”35 Unfortunately, C.
Vann Woodward sees it differently, insisting that despite the “nominal” dissolution of the Klan,
“the campaign of violence, terror and intimidation went forward save temporarily in places
where federal power was displayed and so long as it was sustained. For all the efforts of the
Department of Justice, the deterioration of the freedman‟s status and the curtailment and denial
of his suffrage continued steadily and rapidly.”36 Foner himself concedes, and indeed amply
documents that egregious election-related violence continued in the South, for instance noting
that in Louisiana, “Every election between 1868 and 1876 was marked by rampant violence and
pervasive fraud.”37
Despite Grant‟s 1872 victory, the splitting off of the Liberal Republicans for this election
did signal to Grant the waning national support for Reconstruction, and he began cutting back. 38
The political message was underlined by the overwhelming shift to the Democrats at the
Congressional and state level in 1874.39 Grant intervened militarily only intermittently on
requests for help from Southern Republican governors besieged by racially and politically
32
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motivated violence, but even these interventions were sometimes not popular in the North.40
After he refused early in 1874 to send help to deal with violent disturbances in Mississippi and
Texas, the Northern press (Philadelphia Inquirer and New York Daily Tribune) praised his
restraint.41 The imagery deployed was that of saving democracy at the state level from the
oppressive force of “federal bayonets.”42
In April 1874, Grant finally sent federal troops into Louisiana where something of a race
war was going on between 3500 White Leaguers, mostly Civil War veterans and the official
(black) state militia. After the federal troops ousted the White Leaguers from the city hall and
statehouse that they had occupied, now much of the Northern press was critical.43 Only three
years earlier the San Francisco Daily Alta California had condemned South Carolinians for their
violent unwillingness to let blacks participate in government, but now the same paper
condemned Grant for using federal troops to settle violent election disputes in Louisiana.44 In the
Louisiana situation one sees not only the important role of the rhetoric of self-government (at the
state level), but also the successful deployment of the Big Lie technique by Southerners. The
Colfax massacre took place in April of 1873; it involved the killing of somewhere between one
hundred and four hundred blacks, fifty of whom had laid out a white flag of surrender and many
of whom were shot in the back, by a group of whites organized to seize the county courthouse in
an election dispute.45 This massacre by whites was greeted in much of the Northern press with a
degree of sympathy that is surprising (at least from the perspective of the twenty-first century); it
was depicted “as a self-defense against pillaging ex-slaves who had [fraudulently] cloaked
themselves in authority.”46 One democratic paper in Missouri even had the ex-slaves “sacking
the residences” of whites and “pillaging their plantations.” The killings by the White League
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were called in Northern papers “self-defense” against a “reign of terror.”47 To be sure, the press
was not unanimous. The New York Times headline on the story read, “The War of the Races:
Nearly Three Hundred Negroes Burned to Death by Whites in Louisiana--A Horrible Affair.”48
Still, Northern readers had reason to be confused about what was transpiring in the South.
Speeches by politicians, too, contributed to the confusion. Democratic politicians,
according to Heather Cox Richardson, "insisted that the South was peaceful and less violent than
the North. Republican politicians maintained that South Carolina was (in 1870-71) a bloodbath.”
Horace Greeley's New York Daily Tribune and the San Francisco Daily Alto California, both
Republican papers theretofore staunchly supportive of black rights somehow became convinced
that the violence in South Carolina in the early 1870s was at bottom about poor, non-industrious
blacks trying to use their voting power via the taxing power to obtain benefits for themselves at
the expense of the productive members of society.49 Contributing to this image that Southern
violence was being started by blacks of bad character, unwilling to work their way up in society
and instead trying to seize government power by force and fraud were the wires sent out by
Associated Press, at the time controlled by Southerners. In the months preceding the 1874
elections, wire reports circulated warnings of a “war of the races” supposedly initiated by “black
mobs led by demagogues” attempting to seize power. These accounts “explained” the fact that
the casualties were almost always those of (generally black) Republicans by claiming that white
Democrats had successfully risen up in self-defense against Negro mobs of several hundred (See
above for analogy to self-justifying wife-beaters). The firmly Republican Boston Evening
Transcript, for instance, would publish these wire reports and then critique them as Southern
propaganda, but meanwhile the images of blacks attempting to use their power to undermine
true, liberal democracy were being spread throughout the Northern press.50
Even the drastically watered down Civil Rights Act of 1875, which for two years of
Congressional debate had been highly controversial because of inclusion of a now-deleted school
(and church) desegregation requirement, for which many now-disappointed black leaders had
been earnestly lobbying, received distorted press coverage in otherwise pro-Republican
newspapers.51 The New York Times, for instance, wrote that in the South there were blacks
“who delight in scenes and cheap notoriety,” such as the “[N]egro politician, …the ignorant field
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hand, who by his very brutality has forced his way into, and disgraces, public positions of honor
and trust” who would now use this new federal law to “take every opportunity to inflict petty
annoyances upon…former masters.”52 The thinking here was that individuals of talent and
character who worked hard would in fact rise socially and be welcomed at public establishments,
while others should earn respectability on their merits, and until then not impose themselves on
their supposed betters.

II. Welcoming Reception of Court Decisions Against Reconstruction
It is correct that the Supreme Court undercut federal enforcement efforts beginning with
Justice Bradley‟s Circuit Court decision in 1874 of U.S. v. Cruikshank,53 throwing out the only
three convictions (of three white murderers) that resulted from the Colfax massacre.54 The
Supreme Court upheld Bradley on appeal on March 27, 1876.55 The essence of the problem
identified by Bradley and seconded by the Supreme Court was that the murderers were charged
without a specific allegation that the murder was racially motivated. Using murder to prevent
someone from voting in a state election could not be a crime under the Fifteenth Amendment
unless the government charged and proved that the murder was not only to block the person from
voting but also was racially motivated.56
On the same day the Court struck down for the first time as unconstitutional a section of a
Reconstruction Civil Rights Act in the decision, U.S. v. Reese.57 This decision pronounced
unconstitutional Sections Three and Four of the May 31, 1870 Enforcement Act on the grounds
that the phrase “as aforesaid” was insufficient indication of the phrase “on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude” that appeared earlier in the statute. The majority‟s was
plainly a perverted reading of the statute as Justice Ward Hunt points out in dissent, and this
decision is one of the pieces of evidence commonly used to depict the Court as blocking a
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marauders against blacks, Blyew v. U.S., 80 U.S. 581 (1872). There the Court, over Bradley‟s
dissent, issued a narrow interpretation of the statutorily created category of cases where
jurisdiction could be removed from state to federal court on grounds of civil rights deprivations.
This was a matter of federal statutory interpretation; both houses of Congress and the Presidency
were in Republican hands in 1872. Congress initiated no attempt to alter the statute.
55

U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.542 (1876).

56

25 F.Cas. 707, 715 (“It should, at least, have been shown that the conspiracy was entered into
to deprive the injured persons of their right to vote by reason of their race, color or previous
condition of servitude.”)
57

U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
12

Congress interested in Reconstruction. However, a close look at the U.S. Code reveals that a
year before the Reese decision, in the work that went into producing the Revised Code, adopted
March 3, 1875, the phrase “as aforesaid” was removed from both these sections, in an apparent
effort to protect white Republicans in the South whose public meetings were being broken up
along with those of blacks.58
The Reese decision makes little sense as applied to the statute as written when the culprit
Reese was charged but makes good sense as applied to the law as the Court (likely) knew it to
currently read. And the Court‟s idea of this good sense was precisely the sense of the Congress
who debated at considerable length how to word the Fifteenth Amendment: versions guarantying
some form of adult male suffrage versus the version chosen, which allowed all sorts of
restrictions on voting so long as they were not racially based. By 1876 The Supreme Court was
not thwarting a Congress bent on Reconstruction; rather it was narrowly interpreting statutes and
constitutional powers in a way that fit the temper of the times. The Court allowed some leeway
in these decisions (prior to the 1890s) for Congress to strengthen the Reconstructions statutes if it
had chosen to.
In the summer of 1876 Frederick Douglass chided the Republican Convention for
inadequate efforts to protect Southern blacks from “the slaveholder‟s shotgun.” The response of
the Republican New York Evening Post reflected popular Northern views of the day: “It is to be
regretted that Frederick Douglass will not teach to colored people the lesson of self-dependence,
instead of always demanding for them fresh guarantees, by proclamation, by statute, and by
bayonet, of the rights which they must largely maintain for themselves.”59
III. Invitations from Congress to Undermining of Jury and Suffrage Rights
The 1875 Civil Rights Act from the Republican lame duck Congress explicitly permitted
exactly the kind of qualifications of jurors that were facially neutral as to race but later used to
exclude blacks that the U.S. Supreme Court has been criticized by modern scholars for having
permitted in its 1880 decisions. Its Section Four reads as follows:
SEC. 4. That no citizen possessing all other qualifications
which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for
service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude; and any officer or other person charged
with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who shall
exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid
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shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and be fined not more than five thousand dollars.

Qualifications based on individual attainments such as education or property were acceptable in
terms of Lockean liberalism, but the birth-based attribute of race was not. [here discuss cases
briefly?]
Moreover, the Congressional debates on the 15th Amendment openly anticipated the
kinds of qualifications on voters that were later deployed to keep blacks, along with many poor
and poorly educated whites, from voting in the South. Wording that would have forbidden such
regulations was voted down by Congress after extensive debate on the issue. In fact, Congress
members explicitly anticipated all of the various barriers to voting that Southern states deployed
with success to remove blacks from the ballot box (apart from the technique of blatantly
discriminatory manipulation of the rules with racist intent and effect). These included literacy
and property tests, the understanding clause, the poll tax, as well as complicated and/or
deliberately confusing registration requirements.60 [here discuss cases briefly?]
Both the regulations on jury service and those on voting--had they been administered
with racial neutrality, which of course they were not--are expressions of Lockean liberalism.
They pertain to individual attainments rather than a birth-based group trait. The Supreme Court
opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), by the way, seems to have been an invitation to someone
to bring a lawsuit on the unequal administration of such laws. Had the federal government been
motivated to do so, and had the Court stuck to the promise of Yick Wo that it would oppose
practices administering laws “with an evil eye and an unequal hand” as to race, Southern
practices in the late nineteenth century U.S. might have come closer to being genuinely liberal.61
But then nineteenth century ideas about state-level self-government may still have gotten in the
way. The U.S.A. really was not the united country that it turned into in the twentieth century.
And that newer, tighter union may have come as much from things like television and airconditioning and industrialization of the South and jet planes, as it did from Court opinions.
[I stop here for limits of time.]
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